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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa is a maritime nation with an abundance of natural resources. These 
resources must be protected and preserved for the economy of the country. This 
makes the SA Navy a strategic component of South Africa and it must be well 
resourced to provide appropriate protection. In view of this South Africa has a Navy 
with a broad range of balanced capabilities as a key component of the National 
Defence Force in order to support the nation's objectives to project peace or, if 
necessity, strength, during times of tranquillity or tension. Project management plays 
a crucial role in ensuring that the Navy has these capabilities. However, project 
management in the SA Navy is full of challenges. There are a number of factors 
hindering project success in the SA Navy. These factors must be managed and 
understood in order to mitigate their impact on project management in the SA Navy. 
The literature identified various factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. The 
literature identified and treats these factors individually, however, this study proposes 
a holistic system based approach to factors hindering project success in the SA Navy 
and adopts Warfield’s Interactive Management (IM) to investigate these factors. 
Interactive Management is chosen due to the methodology’s ability to encourage 
communication and understanding of the problem among participants as well as to 
facilitate the examination of the interaction between problem elements. The end 
product of the Interactive Management methodology is the graph depicting the 
interaction or relationship between elements. Through the Interactive Management, 
this study identified six key factors hindering project success in the SA Navy namely, 
“Lack of top management support”, “Lack of technical expertise by project managers”, 
“Too much control from superiors”, “High turnover rate of project officers”, “Complexity 
of design” and “Inability to attract and retain talent”. These are the key factors that 
must be addressed in order to ensure success in SA Navy projects.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
There is an abundance of literature in the field of project management and it has 
provided a number of theoretical and practical ideas and methods. The literature 
introduced a framework for measuring project success such as a balance score card 
and critical success factors. Much has been written about project success factors but 
very little on factors hindering project success particularly in the military hence the 
need for this study. Project success in the South African Navy (SA Navy) remains a 
challenge as projects are always delayed and over budget. The project office is 
constantly facing unskilled personnel and budget cuts.   
The purpose of this study is to investigate and analyse factors hindering project 
success in the South African Navy (SA Navy). To achieve this purpose, the study will 
use Warfield’s Interactive Management, a systemic methodology to examine factors 
hindering project success in the SA Navy. Interactive Management (IM) is described 
by Janes (1995) as a methodology that allows the work efforts of a group to become 
fruitful particularly when dealing with complexity. There are four phases in Interactive 
Management: 
 Identification of systems element (Idea generation); 
 Serial ideas clarification; 
 Structuring of ideas which involves the modelling or structuring of the elements 
linked to the problem situation; and 
 Interpretation of the graphs. 
South Africa is a maritime nation and has well-developed ports and maritime 
infrastructure. Between 90% and 95% of South Africa’s import and export trade in 
terms of volume (159 million tons in 2000), or in excess of 75% in terms of value (Rbn 
369 in 2000) is transported by sea (South African Navy, 2000). This makes the SA 
Navy a strategic component of South Africa and it must be well resourced to provide 
appropriate protection. The South African sea water is known for a wealth of food and 
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natural resources and this must be protected at all costs hence the need for the SA 
Navy projects to keep their equipment seaworthy.  
The Republic of South Africa (RSA) is a maritime nation and it is important to consider 
the following:  
 The RSA's ports are the trade gateway for many African countries, 
 This area is rich in unexploited minerals and food resources, 
 The RSA is vulnerable to blockade and the cutting off of its sea routes, and  
 The RSA is vulnerable to the plundering of its marine resources (South African 
Navy, 2000). 
The Navies of the world are responsible for protecting the sea waters of their 
respective countries and this includes the SA Navy. Prior to 1922, the Royal Navy was 
largely responsible for the safety of shipping around the Cape with many South 
Africans serving in a number of their ships (South African Navy, 2000). In today's 
increasingly uncertain and competitive world, the SA Navy continues to protect the 
national interests and responsibilities as well as helping to guard against risks to peace 
and security. 
The SA Navy is now actively cooperating with other African countries and is willing to 
provide assistance and to cooperate in a regional context (South African Navy, 2000). 
The SA Navy also has the ability to further enhance the RSA's prestige abroad and 
encourage trade and sound international relations. It is already playing a leading role 
in this regard and for it to continue doing this it must be well resourced. 
In view of the above the RSA needs a Navy with a broad range of balanced capabilities 
as a key component of the National Defence Force in order to support the nation's 
objectives to project peace or, if necessary, strength, during times of tranquillity or 
tension. Project management plays a crucial role in ensuring that the Navy has these 
capabilities, but, project management in the defence force is very complex. 
There is a huge difference between the Defence and other industrial projects in two 
important respects. First, the state-of-the-art technology is always used in order to 
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achieve the required operational performance and second, defence projects by their 
nature are very large, complex, and interdisciplinary (Locke, 1984, Shenhar and 
Wideman, 2000). Despite the complexity and the technological risk, and the enormous 
potential for budget savings, the management practices, success and failure of 
defence projects have been less researched than those of commercial projects. 
Furthermore, most of the research done and results found of the few studies on 
defence projects are not available to the public and these projects are very complex 
and cumbersome.  
The complexity of the project management process requires a widespread and 
collective attention of a number of budgetary, human, and technical aspects. 
Moreover, projects often have a set of specialised critical success factors whereby if 
they are addressed will improve the chances of project success. Furthermore, projects 
also have factors hindering project success and if not addressed could affect the 
project success negatively. The difference between project success factors and 
factors hindering project success is that the former affect project positively and the 
latter negatively. Adding to the complexity of project management is the defence 
projects which are always faced with among others secrecy, budgetary constraints, 
political interference and they are highly technical at times.  
The success of any project is dependent on the customer follow-up—particularly 
imperative are the members involved in the project and their professional 
qualifications, experience, their sense of responsibility for project success and the 
stability of key members. Defence projects frequently are technically challenging and 
require members to operate at that level. The technological feasibility right from the 
beginning is very critical for military projects success. Moreover, the professional 
qualification and competency of members are proven to be a major success factor in 
many projects.  
Project success in the SA Navy is important for the security of the country and 
protecting the territorial water. For the SA Navy to be able to provide maritime security, 
resources need to be acquired on time with the right quality. The important topic for 
this study is factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. Ninety percent of the 
South African Navy projects are over budget, don’t start on time and take longer than 
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expected (Martin, 2015). Interesting to note is that a number of projects are cancelled 
due to either budget constraints or political interference. Project management in the 
SA Navy remains a challenge and factors hindering project success are numerous. 
Martin (2015), analysed 29 projects since 1996 and discovered the following facts: all 
29 projects started late, 15 projects were discontinued because of financial constraints 
and financial regulations not being adhered to, 14 projects went over budget and 
schedule and one project on completion was rejected as the supplied boats were too 
big for the ships.  This is in a nutshell some of the challenges faced by the SA Navy 
project environment.  
The study will first discuss the success factors. According to (Shenhar and Wideman, 
2000) success factors can be broadly classified as project efficiency, impact on 
customers, business success and preparing for the future. In contrary it is difficult to 
achieve all these factors. According to (Shenhar and Wideman, 2000, Cooke-Davies, 
2002) there is no universal understanding of the success concept. Different people 
perceived success differently. The construction of the Sydney Opera House took 15 
years to construct and it was more than 14 times over the budget, but it was successful 
because it was finally completed, but from a project management perspective it was a 
failure. This could be because the project was not managed according to the traditional 
triangle, which is time, cost and quality. Therefore the concept project success factors 
are clear-cut to everyone. This is supported by (Jugdev and Muller, 2005), that “project 
success is a complex and ambiguous concept and it changes over the project and 
product life cycle”. Despite of the ambiguity, the continued contribution to understand 
the aim makes success factors applicable. Although the purpose of this study is to 
analyse factors hindering project success it is important to bring in project success 
factors. The two concepts are on the opposite side of each other. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There are a number of factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. Most projects 
hardly start or finish on time and some are abandoned in the process due to various 
challenges. During the Arms deal enquiry it came out that the SA Navy is not 
sufficiently equipped to fulfil its mandate. To equip the SA Navy a robust project 
management environment is required. Currently the lengthy acquisition process and 
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budgetary constraints are the main challenge in the SA Navy project management 
environment.  
The SA Navy spent billions of tax payers’ money on projects. But the success of these 
projects leaves much to be desired. Projects are always behind schedule and they 
exceed the allocated budget. There is a high turnover rate of project managers as 
project managers are sometimes promoted to higher ranks in the military. Project 
management in the SA Navy may be inadequate especially in light of the fact that 
command and control is the order of the day in the military. This will limit the project 
managers in their independent thinking and autonomy. 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM 
The aim of this study is to explore, identify and analyse (Stebbins, 2001, Babbie and 
Mouton, 2012) and elaborate (Singleton Jr et al., 1993, Babbie and Mouton, 2012) 
factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. This is done against the backdrop 
of proposing strategies and tactics to address these factors. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To achieve the aim, the study will be directed by the following primary question:  “What 
are the factors hindering project success in the South African Navy?” 
1.5 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
Despite considerable wealth of research involving project success factors, factors 
hindering project success (especially in the SA Navy) are not well researched. This 
gap made it difficult for the researcher to find appropriate information. This study will 
close or narrow this gap. A research focusing on factors hindering project success in 
the SA Navy is needed to better understand and improve the SA Navy projects.   
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
It is advisable to say what is not intended with the research. This helps the researcher 
to focus on the problem statement and not waste time on matters that are not directly 
associated with the problem. Though the study will draw quite significantly on previous 
research on project management, the findings will represent the practical realities in 
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the SA Navy. Geographically speaking, the study will confine itself to Naval Base 
Simon’s Town. In other words, although the study is conducted in South Africa and in 
the SA Navy, it is not a true reflection of the Navy as a whole. This naval base was 
selected because it is the biggest naval base in South Africa and also because of its 
proximity to the researcher. 
1.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In undertaking the study, the researcher will ensure that ethical requirements are 
complied with, in line with the University of Cape Town policy. Firstly, an application 
for ethics clearance will be done through the University of Cape Town’s Ethics 
Committee. Upon the approval of the research project by the University’s Ethics 
Committee, permission to conduct research will be sought from relevant stakeholders. 
Upon the approval of the research project by the relevant authority, the nature and 
purpose of this research project will be explained at length to the potential participants. 
The identity and the institutional association of the researcher (masters’ candidate and 
the university under which this research is conducted) will be revealed to the potential 
participants. The study guarantees that the nature of participation in this study is 
completely voluntary. In this regard, should the participants wish to withdraw their 
participation because of unforeseen circumstances, they will be allowed to do so 
without any undue influence. They will not be forced to partake in the study. The 
responses provided by the study participants will be treated in a strictly confidential 
manner and will be kept safe. The information will typically be kept in a safe place 
where only the researcher has access to the information. The password(s) used to 
upload and store information to the computer will only be known by the researcher and 
nobody else will have access to it.  
Attached to this confidentiality will be stringent measures to ensure anonymity to the 
study participants. Protecting their anonymity will make them feel comfortable while 
participating. There will be no costs that will be incurred by the study participants. 
There will be no discomforts and hurtful feelings on the side of participants. There will 
be no benefits that will accrue to participants for partaking in the study. The 
dissemination of the results will be in the form of a completed masters’ thesis. Finally, 
the informed consent (clearly stipulating the purpose of the study and identity of the 
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researcher) and (preferably written) will be obtained from study participants before any 
workshop is conducted.  
1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The SA Navy has various project offices in the country but only the office in Simon’s 
Town will be used for the study. This is done due to its proximity to the researcher and 
it is the main office which house approximately 80% of the staff working on projects. 
By focusing only on one office might limit the researcher to obtain information from 
other offices.  
Due to the nature of military projects that are filled with confidentiality and secrecy, 
some information might only be available to the SA Navy. This could limit the 
researcher to get to other factors hindering project success. Due to the bureaucratic 
nature of the military and its command and control culture, participants might withhold 
the truth for fear of victimisation. The fact that the researcher is a uniform member in 
the SA Navy, some senior members might make it difficult to obtain information.  
The study will start by giving the background, methodology and the problem statement 
followed by the literature review in Chapter 2. The philosophical foundation of the study 
will be established in the section dealing with systems thinking followed by a 
meticulous explanation of how IM will be applied in the investigation of factors 
hindering project success in the SA Navy. The study will analyse and discuss research 
findings and lastly a conclusion will be drawn, and recommendations and opportunities 
for future research will be identified. 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
Chapter 1: This chapter will provide the introduction and background to the study. The 
chapter will also provide the problem statement, research question, aim, research 
proposition, and the methods to be used. The chapter aims to set the scene and 
introduce the reader to the study. 
Chapter 2: This chapter will cover the literature review extensively. The literature on 
project success and project management success will be covered.  
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Chapter 3: Chapter 3 will cover the research methodology used in the study.  
Chapter 4: This chapter will present the research results and interpretation. 
Chapter 5: This chapter will conclude the study and provide a summary. It is in this 
chapter where recommendations will be made and prospects for future research will 
be highlighted.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Project management is a very complex process and requires a widespread and 
collective attention to a wide facet of human, budgetary and technical aspects. 
Defence projects are not unique as they are complex and require an extensive 
technical expertise. Success factors refer to the elements that are necessary for the 
project to achieve its intended objective. These factors are required for ensuring the 
success of a project. While, factors hindering project success refer to those factors 
affecting the project negatively and if ignored could cause harm to the project success. 
The correlation between the two is that factors hindering project success affect the 
project negatively while project success factors affect the project positively.  
Like any other organisation there are critical success factors and factors hindering 
project success in the SA Navy. The purpose of this chapter is to compile a literature 
review to support the study. This will assist the researcher to ask relevant questions 
during interactive management workshop. This chapter is important in laying down the 
foundation for the study and will contribute in identifying factors hindering project 
success in the SA Navy. The chapter starts by giving an overview of the acquisition 
process in the SA Navy. This is done to highlight the complexity of the defence 
acquisition process. The chapter further defines project management and going 
deeper into what constitutes project and project management success. The chapter 
further identifies factors hindering project success in general and later focuses 
specifically on factors hindering project success both in the broader military and in the 
SA Navy. Due to limited research on factors hindering project success in the SA Navy, 
other navies such as the United States and others will be discussed.  It is important to 
note that these factors differ from industry to industry. The chapter is drawn from a 
number of authoritative sources in project management. As a point of departure it is 
important to define project and project management. 
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2.2 PROJECT AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT DEFINED 
Project management is defined by PMI (2013) as the application of knowledge, skills, 
tools and techniques to project activities to meet project requirements. Project 
management is accomplished through the application and integration of the project 
management processes of initiating, planning, executing, monitoring and controlling, 
and closing (PMI, 2013). According to Maylor (1999) project management includes 
planning, organising, directing, and controlling activities in addition to motivating what 
is usually the most expensive resource on the project – the people. Project on the 
other hand is defined by Gido and Clement (2015) as an endeavour to accomplish a 
specific objective through a unique set of interrelated activities and the effective 
utilisation of resources. The DAP (2010) defines project as a complex activity 
consisting of a planned undertaking of a unique nature over a limited timeframe that 
has a specifically described beginning and ending. From the above definitions it is 
clear that project management is a complex process and this complexity, if not 
understood or managed, can lead to project failure.  
2.3 PROJECT SUCCESS DEFINED 
Since the study focuses on factors hindering project success in the SA Navy it is 
important to begin by defining project success very briefly. Various authors have 
researched the concept of project success but this concept remains loosely defined. 
A lot has been written about project success and most authors differ on what 
constitutes project success. Project success differs from industry to industry. A project 
that is completed within the budget and time may be deemed successful but might not 
meet customer requirements (Baker et al., 1983). Although much has been written 
about project success, there is no consistent interpretation of the term project success. 
According to McCoy (1986) there is no standardised definition of project success or 
an accepted methodology of measuring it and Wells (1998) also observed that little 
attention is given to the definition of project success except in broad terms.  
Project success is defined by Tuman (1986) as achieving everything as hoped, 
anticipating all project requirements and having sufficient resources to meet needs in 
a timely manner.  Authors such as De Wit (1986) considers a project a success if there 
is a high level of satisfaction concerning the project outcome among key stakeholders. 
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The key difference between the above two definitions is that the latter includes the 
satisfaction factor as a success measure. To determine whether a project is a success 
or not is a very complex and ambiguous process. Delays in projects are common but 
projects can still be considered successful after all. Project success is not to be 
confused with project management success. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The scope of success in the project life cycle, (Munns and Bjeirmi, 1996) 
De Wit (1998) was among the authors to point out the difference between project 
success and project management success. Successful project management will 
contribute to the achievement of a project but project management will not stop a 
project deliverables from failing to succeed (De Wit, 1998) and (Sigurðarson, 2009). 
According to Baccarini (1999) project management success is about fulfilling the time, 
cost and quality criteria whereas project success focuses on the effects of the project’s 
final deliverables such as project goals, purpose and stakeholders’ satisfaction. 
Project success will differ to different people due to various perceptions and this can 
lead to disagreement about what constitutes success of a project (Liu and Walker, 
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1998). Users and stakeholders are most likely to have different perceptions of the 
overall project. Three reasons suggested by Munns and Bjeirmi (1996) for this different 
perception are: first, this is due to the universal approach that all projects are similar,  
secondly the subjective nature of success or poorly defined success measures and 
lastly limited number of managerial variables.  
According to Munns and Bjeirmi (1996), failure to distinguish between project 
management success and project success will worsen this difference in perception. 
The project management success focuses on the “iron triangle” and the quality of 
management process. The other part of project success relates to the effects of the 
project deliverables or service (Baccarini, 1999). Therefore a project can be viewed as 
successful despite the time, quality and costs not being met.  
The project management team focus on successfully reaching phase four as seen in 
Figure 2.1 where they will terminate their involvement but the client is involved in all 
the phases. The project management success scope is phase 1- 4 and scope of 
project success spans over all the phases (Munns and Bjeirmi, 1996). For the purpose 
of this study, project success will be defined as the successful delivery of the end 
product that satisfies the customer and meet the customer’s expectations. 
2.4 THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION 
PROCESS 
It is important in this study to give an overview of the military acquisition process. The 
process is applicable to all arms of services in the South African National Defence 
Force. The acquisition process is lengthy and full of bureaucracy. This section is 
important for the study as it shows the complexity of the process and why complexity 
theory is necessary for this study. The complexity of the acquisition process is due to 
a number of stakeholders involved in the process. In the military context procurement 
and acquisition are two different concepts.  
According to DAP (2010) acquisition deals mainly with the acquiring of complex 
systems, such as weapon systems.  It utilises the system engineering process 
translating military requirements into specifications against which purchasing can take 
place. Procurement on the other hand entails the purchasing of all commercial 
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equipment, spares, machinery and consumables, as well as services (DAP, 2010). 
Both acquisition and procurement are carried out in an authorised and completely 
auditable fashion. The process for project related acquisition is fully documented in 
the DAP (2010). Non-project related procurement is carried out in accordance with the 
Department of State Expenditure Regulations. Both processes are subject to internal 
audit and inspections, and audits by the Auditor-General. 
It can take approximately two years before a project can be authorised and registered 
in the SA Navy. A project will be authorised and/or directed through Military, 
Governance, Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) and Joint 
Management Forums (DAP, 2010). All these forums have properly authorised 
constitutions that is revised on a regular basis. Once the applicable project phases 
have been approved by the Armament Acquisition Control Board, Armament 
Acquisition Steering Board and Armament Acquisition Council, contracts on industry 
for the execution of the applicable phase can be initiated via the ARMSCOR 
contracting process. 
The project has to go through various forums both within the Department of Defence 
and outside the department. Project documentation may not be submitted to any 
governance forum without prior recommendation by the relevant military 
recommendation forums. The military recommendation forums are essentially 
instituted to verify and authorise the needs of the defence force. Each Service or 
Division (that is the Army, Air Force, Navy and Health Service) has forums specifically 
tasked and mandated for the approval of the project and subsequent milestone 
documentation in a coordinated fashion within that organisational component in order 
to recommend needs to higher authorities.  
Once the project passed the internal forum (that is the SA Navy) the next step is to 
take it to the governance forum. Governance forums are instituted for the verification 
of process integrity, the authorisation of project phase approvals and allocation and 
commitment of financial resources. The approval structure for submissions consists of 
three levels as indicated in the following table. 
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Board Chairperson Level of Approval Tasks 
Armaments 
Acquisition 
Control Board 
(AACB) 
Chief 
Defence 
Materiel 
Departmental node 
for the initiation and 
completion of 
projects. 
Screens all milestone 
documentation  
Armament 
Acquisition 
Steering Board 
(AASB) 
Secretary for 
Defence 
Final approval of 
Non- Cardinal 
projects 
Recommends 
milestone documents, 
value systems 
Armaments 
Acquisition 
Council (AAC) 
Minister Final approval for 
Cardinal projects 
AAC will present 
Cardinal projects to 
Cabinet. 
Table 2.1: Project approval structure, authors own compilation from (DAP, 2010)  
2.5 PRESENTATION OF FACTORS HINDERING PROJECT SUCCESS 
This section will deal with factors hindering project success in general. It is important 
to note that factors contributing to project success are more positive (driving force) 
and must be taken into consideration to ensure success. On the other hand factors 
hindering project success are negative factors and they can affect the project 
negatively if not well managed. There are many factors hindering project success and 
this range from among others project related factors to organisational factors. 
Characteristics of a project have been neglected in the literature although they 
constitute one of the important dimensions in performance (Cooke-Davies, 2002). 
Schedule duration and urgency are identified as the critical factors by Morris and Hugh 
(1986). However, many projects fail because of many other factors inherent to the 
project. Belassi and Tukel (1996) list six factors which are the value and size of the 
project, how unique the project activities are, project network density, life cycle of the 
project and urgency of the project outcome. The study by Tukel and Rom (1995) 
discovered that most large projects will exceed their duration. Therefore, if one uses 
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the project duration as performance evaluation, caution should be taken about the size 
of a project and the effectiveness of the penalties (Belassi and Tukel, 1996).  
Belassi and Tukel (1996) also highlight risk as one of the factors that hinders project 
success. If the risk is not clearly identified or if it is poorly managed it could affect the 
project severely. A poor risk planning will jeopardise the accomplishment of the project 
objective (Gido and Clement, 2015). Risk is inherent in any project and should form 
part of the planning process and must be incorporated at each stage of the project life 
cycle. 
Project planning begins early in the project’s life cycle and if the plan is wrong it will 
affect the succeeding stages of the project. Planning is indispensable in project 
management (Munns and Bjeirmi, 1996). If the plan is poor everything is bound to fail 
in projects. With poor planning the scope will be incorrectly defined and this can lead 
to disaster. In the planning phase a number of activities will be identified. Not only 
must the number of activities be taken into consideration but also how familiar the type 
of project undertaken to the organisation is as the project manager’s performance can 
be heavily affected by the uniqueness of the activities. If the activities are standard it 
will be easier for the project manager to plan, schedule and monitor projects, but if the 
activities are ambiguous the project manager could struggle. If enough time is not 
allocated to planning, and scheduling the project will most likely exceed budgets and 
become unsuccessful (Pinto and Slevin, 1987). Therefore poor project planning will 
hinder project success severely.  
There are many other factors linked to the skills and characteristics of project 
managers and their team members and these factors are suggested for the successful 
completion of projects. Pinto and Slevin (1987) demonstrated the importance of the 
project managers’ selection process. According to Pinto and Slevin (1987) it is 
important to select project managers with the necessary technical and administrative 
skills for successful termination of a project. Poor selection of a project manager can 
jeopardise the project. Pinto and Slevin (1987) presented that the commitment of 
project managers and their competence is critical during the planning and termination 
phase. The other factor identified is the competence of the team members. The project 
manager can have the know-how but with incompetent team members the success of 
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a project is doomed. All these factors will hinder the project success and will also affect 
satisfaction from customers or the client and of project acceptance.  
Equally, there must be a well-established communication network between the project 
manager, the organisation and the client in order for the project outcome to be 
accepted by the client (Belassi and Tukel, 1996). Poor communication at all levels can 
also hinder the project success. This is important especially for projects with multiple 
stakeholders such as military projects. 
Tukel and Rom (1995) highlight top management support as one of the most critical 
factors. Lack of support from the top management will hinder the success of any 
project as top management provide resources. This support will even be stronger if 
there is a project champion from the top management who will assist the project 
manager to understand and achieve the objectives specified by the top management 
and the client. Top management normally have access to resources which are 
overseen by functional managers. The support given by the functional managers is 
determined by the top management support. For projects that are part of functional 
structures the availability of resources is easy as functional managers are usually 
project managers (Tukel and Rom, 1995). But acquiring resources for matrix 
organisational projects can be difficult as this requires negotiation skills and some 
positional power (Tukel and Rom, 1995).  There are other factors that hinder the 
project success which are beyond the control of the project manager or organisations.  
These factors are external to the organisation but can hinder the success of a project.  
A number of environmental factors such as political, economic, social, technological, 
ecological and legal will affect the project negatively or positively. Pinto and Slevin 
(1987) found that most of these environmental factors affect the project during the 
planning phase. However, some of these factors will affect the project at all phases 
such as the weather, the social environment and economic environment. At times 
these factors can be so severe that is could lead to project termination. Government 
and public attitude can be an influential external factor. An outside client can also be 
considered as an external factor. If projects are internal the client is from within the 
organisation and therefore client factors can be classified under organisational factors. 
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Sources Factors hindering project success 
(Kumar, 1989, Cash and 
Fox, 1992, Baker et al., 
1974a, Kerzner, 1987, 
Baker et al., 1974b), 
(Cooke-Davies, 2002) 
 
Unclear objectives 
Poor project administration 
Poor relationship with client 
Politics  
Efficiency 
Conflicts and Profit 
Morris and Hugh (1986); 
(Pinto and Covin, 1922, 
Pinto and Slevin, 1987) 
Unrealistic goal 
Inability to satisfy customers 
Poor implementation process 
Lack of management support 
Avots (1969); Munns and 
Bjeirmi (1996) 
Inadequate basis for project 
Wrong or incompetent project manager 
Lack or poor  or top management support 
Insufficiently defined tasks 
Poor project management techniques; 
Misusing of management techniques 
Poor planning of project closedown  
Poor or lack of commitment 
(Belassi and Tukel, 1996, 
Helfrich, 2016) 
Poor planning 
Poorly managed risk 
Insufficient funds 
Lack of commitment from project team 
Incompetence of project manager 
Complexity  
Poor stake holder engagement and analysis 
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Unrealistic time frame 
Table 2.2: Summary of factors hindering project success 
These factors are generic and are not specific to a particular industry. They can also 
be found in the military projects. This section was meant to lay the foundation before 
discussing factors hindering project success in the military. The next section deals with 
factors hindering project success in the military.  
2.6 PRESENTATION OF FACTORS HINDERING PROJECT SUCCESS IN THE 
MILITARY  
Military projects are mostly complex and always draw public and political attention. 
According to Tatar (2010) militaries are very bureaucratic and due to command and 
control system, project managers within the military environment lack autonomy. It is 
important that the project manager have autonomy and independence to approach the 
task. According to Tatar (2010) there is a high level of interference in military projects 
and the project manager will have to follow orders to avoid any punitive action. 
Defence projects are very complex and require independent thinking. Lack of 
autonomy by the project manager and his/her team can hinder project success. 
Most defence project is very complex and complexity if not properly managed or 
understood can hinder project success in the defence sector. The development of 
complex systems poses many challenges. According to Demir (2015) military projects 
are large-scale and use a sophisticated software which adds complexity to the 
projects. Due to this complexity, most work will have to be outsourced and this requires 
proper communication between stakeholders. Therefore complexity is one of the 
factors hindering project success in the military. 
One of the other factors identified in the literature hindering project success in the 
military is a lack of funding. Many defence forces continue to struggle to overcome 
various challenges brought by budget cuts (Preda, 2013). Defence forces rely heavily 
on government for funding and they have to compete with other departments such as 
housing, health and education to mention but a few. According to Preda (2013) many 
defence projects are discontinued due to a lack of funding. Defence projects rely 
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heavily on software today and software is the major component in any defence system 
(Hagen et al., 2012). The success of any weapon system depends on the success of 
the system software but without adequate funding the project will be unsuccessful. It 
is however pointless if funds are available but they are not used for the intended 
purpose due to corruption.  
Corruption is a well-known factor in government projects and procurement. The 
military as part of government is also being influenced by corrupt practices during the 
procurement process. Corruption has a negative impact on defence projects by 
creating economic inefficiencies, increasing the costs of doing business, reducing 
competition, scaring potential investors and most importantly compromising on quality 
(Preda, 2013). Military projects are often large and lengthy - their exact value is difficult 
to monitor and therefore may present lucrative opportunities for corruption. It is easier 
to collect substantial bribes on large defence projects than on small procurement such 
as uniform. However, dealing with corruption and having funding will not achieve 
success without talented individuals. Having talented individuals will help towards 
project success.  
Inability to attract and retain talent is identified by Oueslati (2016) as a factor hindering 
project success in the military. When engineers join the military from universities the 
only thing in mind is how to make and earn more money (Oueslati, 2016). A defence’s 
project success lies in research, development and experiment and for research to 
succeed takes time. According to Oueslati (2016) these engineers are not encouraged 
to think outside the box and those with the ability to think are subdued. This is due to 
interference as the military operates within a command and control environment.  
Numerous studies in the United States Naval projects indicate that talent shortage is 
a major contributing factor to project failures.  
Tishler et al. (1996) analysed what influenced the success of defence projects in Israel. 
According to their study, organisational and management style variables have a 
considerable impact on Israel’s defence project’s success. The most important factor 
hindering project success in Israel’s defence is the lack of ‘esprit the corps’ in the 
development team; lack of leadership, lack of technical qualifications among the 
development team; instability of ‘key’ personnel for the entire duration of the 
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development phase; and a lack of professionally experienced project managers 
(Tishler et al., 1996). There are many factors hindering project success in the military 
and Table 2.3 indicates other factors as identified by various authors.  
Source Factors hindering project success in the military 
Demir (2015) Poor understanding of project integration management 
Poor project scope management 
Inability to manage time  
Lack of funding 
Poor risk management 
Poor communications management 
Poor procurement systems 
Project stakeholders management 
Corruption  
Preda (2013) Complexity 
No risk plan 
Poor communication 
Political interference 
Poor stakeholder management 
Lack of top management support 
High turnover rate of personnel 
Top management interference 
Bureaucratic procurement system 
Corruption 
Tatar (2010); (Tishler et 
al., 1996) 
Length of defence projects 
Inadequate funding 
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Table 2.3: Summary of factors hindering project success in the military 
 
2.7 PRESENTATION OF FACTORS HINDERING PROJECT SUCCESS IN THE 
SA NAVY 
The previous section analysed factors hindering project success in the military. These 
factors are also applicable to the SA Navy as part of the military milieu. The section is 
important for the study as it laid the foundation for factors hindering project success in 
the SA Navy. Only a few studies in the project management literature concentrate on 
the military and factors hindering project success in the military. Even fewer studies 
concentrated on factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. The author relied 
on unpublished documents of the SA Navy and the defence web. Other navies will 
also be analysed to get a broader perspective on factors hindering project success in 
the SA Navy. It is clear that factors hindering project success in the SA Navy are similar 
to those in the literature. In this section factors hindering project success in navies of 
other countries will be discussed as this can also be applicable to the SA Navy and 
add value to the study.  
Poorly managed risk 
Development based on government regulations 
Poor coordination 
Lack of technical expertise 
High turnover rate of personnel 
Government regulations 
Lengthy and bureaucratic procurement system 
Command and control 
Corruption  
Lack of autonomy of project manager 
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Like many other identified factors in the previous section, one of the key factors 
hindering project success in the SA Navy is the budgetary constraints. According to 
Helfrich (2016) many projects in the SA Navy are not started on time due to budget 
constraints and some of them have to be abandoned half way. Helfrich (2016) 
identified two key projects for the SA Navy which started in 2014 but due to budget 
challenges have not yet started. Tenders were published in 2014 and according to the 
Department of Defence (2016) Annual Report the total cost of the offers received from 
bidders exceeded the available capital budget and the SA Navy is reviewing the total 
budget before a decision is made regarding continuation of the contracting process.  
Similarly, acquisition of the British destroyers shows how a lack of funding can 
contribute to project failure. Due to budget constraints, the Royal Navy cancelled the 
project and opted for an alternative design of the Sheffield Class which were lighter 
and less expensive (Bennett, 2010). The size of the class was further reduced as the 
costs of the first ship threatened to rise. The ship’s bow was reduced and the beam to 
length ratio was decreased and as a result the ships became poor sea keepers, with 
very poor accommodation and could not carry the weight of a full defence system 
(Bennett, 2010). These ships were designed to defend the fleet from air attack but they 
could not even defend themselves. The ceiling imposed on the costs of these ships 
contributed to the project failure. Although the Navy projects are struggling financially, 
there is always a problem of budget/costs overrun and schedule delays. 
According to (GAO, 2008e) the United States Naval acquisition costs for their 
weapons’ systems were 26 percent over budget in 2007 with a total of $295 billion. 
This is up from $42 billion for the study conducted in 2000. Figure 2.2 gives an 
overview of the budget overrun in the United States naval acquisition. The (GAO, 
2008e) reported that the average schedule delay was approximately 21 months and 
from the 33 percent on schedule, 38 percent is 1 to 24 months late and 29 percent 
more than two years behind (see Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.2: A vicious cycle of budget overruns, from (GAO, 2008c). 
 
Figure 2.3: United States Naval Acquisition Schedule delays, from (United States 
Government  Accountability GAO, 2008e). 
The (GAO, 2008c) also mentioned program management challenges as one of the 
factors hindering project success in the United States Navy. Research shows that 
program management challenges in the Navy is on the rise. In the United States Navy 
program management like planning, staffing and finance integration played a role in 
driving budgets overrun (Deloitte, 2009). The United States Naval program 
management is very complex and faces many challenges. These challenges could 
include (GAO, 2008b, GAO, 2008a, GAO, 2008d): 
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 The Department of Defence in general relies heavily on contractors from 
outside to perform roles that have been performed by government in the past.  
 There is a frequent program managers’ turnover which take place during the 
system development and demonstration phase. On average, the tenure for 
program managers in the 39 United States Naval major acquisition programs 
was 17 months. This is less than what the Department of Defence prescribed. 
This creates problems as there is no accountability and continuity and ultimately 
the project will fail.  
 Program managers have no decision-making capability as they are not 
empowered to do so. They have little control over new requirements, and have 
no authority over staffing.  
Bennett (2010) mentioned complexity as one of the factors hindering project success 
in the United States Navy. This is due to the fact that modern weapons systems have 
become so complex that the individuals involved cannot comprehend them. Weapons 
systems may involve a million or more elements of lines of computer codes (Bennett, 
2010). Even a small project such as the Australian Bay Class Minehunters contain 
science ranging from electromagnetism, shock waves and marine biology to mention 
a few (Bennett, 2010). There is no individual scientist or engineer who possesses such 
a spectrum required skills to deal and understand all issues involved in these projects. 
Their contracts are large and complex. The Collen Class Submarine contract in the 
United States covered 22 000 pages, 600 sub-contracts and contained 250 000 
activities to be scheduled, managed, and networked (Stuban et al., 1999). The 
unexpected interface between countless activities aggravates a project uncertainty 
and risk. As a result many of these projects fail in the midst of complexity. Due to this 
complexity, there is a high level of interdependency. 
Interdependence is also one of the factors hindering project success according to 
Bennett (2010). There are many factors that cannot be controlled by the project officer. 
Change in any of those factors can affect project success. This was seen in the 
Australian Naval Defence (Australian Governemnt, 2009). During the production 
phase, the Australian Navy experienced challenges due to interdependency.  This 
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interdependency sometimes requires structural changes which delay and increase the 
costs of the ships.   
According to Helfrich (2016) the high turnover rate of personnel in the project 
environment is a contributing factor that hinders project success. As mentioned earlier, 
defence projects are lengthy in their nature and as a result project managers’ change 
as they take up senior positions elsewhere within the SA Navy. Therefore there is no 
continuity within the project environment. The challenge with human resources in the 
Navy is that the provision of the required to manage the project is outside the ambit of 
the project manager. There is therefore a need for the Navy project managers to have 
sincere decision-making authority on personnel assignment and this is the trademark 
of successful private sector’s major projects (Bennett, 2010). 
According to Helfrich (2016) formal qualification in project management is not a 
requirement in the SA Navy. Any Navy member can become a project officer 
(manager) without any formal qualification in projects. Therefore project managers in 
the SA Navy lack technical expertise and are more of project administrators than 
managers. Project officers will be sent on a project course in Pretoria at a later stage 
but this course is not a prerequisite to be appointed as a project manager. 
The other identified factor is the lengthy and painful government acquisition process. 
The Government’s procurement and acquisition system is regulated by pieces of 
legislation and if not followed properly could hinder the success of SA Navy projects 
(Dvir and Ben, 1999). If this process is not followed accordingly one could be guilty of 
financial misconduct which is a punishable offence. According to Dvir and Ben (1999) 
those responsible for acquisition do not come from the project environment and 
therefore, will not relax policies for the benefit of the project. Acquisition managers and 
project managers are sometimes talking a different language.  
Helfrich (2016) identified the lack of a Naval Research and Development Centre as a 
contributing factor. This could be a Naval Research organisation within the SA Navy. 
It will primarily be responsible for applied research, developing prototype defense 
systems and full-scale defense systems with industry partnership. The experiences 
acquired within the Naval Research Centre could be used as a starting point for 
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establishing other military research organisations. Therefore, it could be considered 
as a role model. Without this the SA Navy relies on consultants and outside companies 
for technical advice and these outsiders are not the end user of the product and this 
increases the costs of the project.  
In trying to identify factors hindering project success the United States Government 
Accounting Office (USGAO) examined the program of building submarine ballistic 
missiles, which was considered an unsuccessful project because of schedule and 
performance as identified (Dvir et al., 2006). The USGAO identified five main factors 
that were considered the main factors hindering the success of the submarine project: 
instability of funds and instability of the operational plan; full responsibility for the whole 
program by more than one organisation; instability of key personnel in the program 
office; lack of professional and technical expertise in the program office; limited 
communication channels within and outside of the project (Dvir et al., 2006).  
A lack of autonomy by project managers is considered a hindering factor by (Helfrich, 
2016). Project managers in the SA Navy are uniform members and are subjected to 
the military disciplinary code. Therefore they follow orders and they can only advise 
as project managers but ultimately superiors who might not have any knowledge of 
the project or project management have a final say.  
A previous study by Dvir and Ben (1999) focusing on the causes of project failure in 
the United States Navy analysed team characteristics and management style. The 
authors also analysed cultural barriers. The main variables as identified by Carver  and 
Jackson (2006) are: outside of work activities (activities which are not directly related 
to the project and usually done after working hours) for improving the cohesion of the 
development team; members not perceiving their work as important; reluctance of the 
project team and top management to accept new ideas; inability to create an 
atmosphere of partnership, non-existence of a mechanism for distribution of lessons 
learnt in previous projects; and, not creating an organisational culture that encourages 
cooperation and a sense of identification with the project’s goals. 
Dvir and Ben (1999) mention diversity as one of the factors hindering project success 
in the Navy. Westerveld (2003) acknowledged that when managing diverse projects 
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judgment is generally made by several and diverse stakeholders over different periods 
of time. Diversity reflects the degree of variation among stakeholders or within the 
project scope. The diversity of stakeholders in the Navy projects involve geographical 
locations, national cultures, working practices, awareness of objectives (goal 
misperception), and the variety of skills or disciplines that are used in a project (Dvir 
and Ben, 1999). In view of the above discussion one can conclude that the naval 
projects have some degree of complexity.  
The following table summarises what is considered factors hindering project success 
in the Navy:  
Factors (Helfrich, 
2016) 
(Dvir et al., 
2006) 
(Dvir and 
Ben, 1999) 
USA 
Acquisition 
GAO 
 
Budget constraints ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Procurement 
process 
✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Political 
interference 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
High turnover rate 
of project team 
✓ ✓ ✓   
Lack of technical 
expertise 
✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Poor 
communication 
✓  ✓  ✓ 
Not understanding 
the risk 
✓ ✓ ✓   
Not performing 
quality audits 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Poor leadership ✓  ✓   
Inexperienced 
project managers 
 ✓ ✓  ✓ 
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High turnover rate 
of personnel 
✓  ✓ ✓  
Misuse of 
command and 
control  
✓  ✓  ✓ 
Table 2.4: Summary of factors hindering project success in the Navy 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
The literature analysed so far gave an overview of factors hindering project success 
in the SA Navy. Although the literature came from authoritative sources, it lacks 
substance and its drawback is that there is no interrelationship or interconnection of 
the identified factors. The identified factors appeared to be independent which is not 
the case. There could be various reasons why these factors are not interrelated. The 
research methods used could not provide the analysis of the interrelation of elements. 
The literature also fails to recognise the complexity of the defence acquisition process. 
To solve this problem, the interactive management approach will be utilised. 
There is an abundance of project management literature concentrating on the critical 
success factors that affect project success. While many of these studies produce a 
number of critical success factors, each list differs in its scope and purpose. Even less 
studies focussed on factors hindering project success in the military particularly in the 
SA Navy. The review of the literature indicates that military projects are complex and 
unique. The literature indicates that most military projects fail due to a number of 
issues such as budget, risk, and quality. The literature focused on military in general 
and briefly the SA Navy and other navies of the world. In view of these the author is 
interested in identifying factors hindering project success in the SA Navy.  
The literature in this chapter started to define project management and project 
success. The literature further revealed that for far too long project success has always 
been attributes to the “iron triangle” that is the time, quality and costs. These criteria 
have been criticised by many authors as being insufficient for many reasons. 
Therefore, the time, quality and costs cannot be the sole criteria for measuring project 
success. The literature tried to make a distinction between project management and 
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project management success. Successful project management will contribute to the 
achievement of a project but project management will not stop a project deliverables 
from failing to succeed. The project management success focuses on the “iron 
triangle” and the quality of the management process. The literature highlighted that a 
project can be viewed as successful despite the time, quality and costs not being met. 
The literature deliberately analysed project success factors before analysing factors 
hindering project success. Project success factors are the positive factors and if not 
taken into consideration a project will not succeed. Project success factors are 
therefore a must do to ensure success whereas factors hindering project success are 
the negative factors as they influence the project negatively.  
The literature further identified factors hindering project success in general, in the 
military and in the SA Navy. Factors hindering project success in the military can also 
be applicable to the SA Navy as the Navy forms part of the military. Some of these 
factors are internal to the Navy and others are external. It is clear from the literature 
that some of the factors hindering project success in the SA Navy are very unique and 
only found in the Navy. Factors hindering project success in the SA Navy will also be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. These factors will be discussed from the 
perspective of the SA Navy members. These factors will be from the perspective of 
SA Navy members.  
Lastly, an overview of the acquisition process was highlighted to give an indication of 
the complex process the SA Navy has to follow. This was discussed to show the 
complexity of the process and to justify the use of complexity theory in the research 
methodology of this study. The following chapter discusses the research methodology 
of the study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As a point of departure, this chapter aims to introduce the methodology used in the 
study. Given the world’s diverse complexities, social scientists often prefer to employ 
a plethora of research methods in order to interrogate the nature of social reality. 
Because of the complexity of defence projects and multiple stake holders involved, the 
use of reductionism and system thinking is necessary.  
In addressing the objectives and questions of the research, the study takes cue from 
the scholarly contribution made by Stacy Carter and Miles Little in, Justifying 
knowledge, justifying method, taking action: Epistemologies, methodologies, and 
methods in qualitative research which was published in 2007. In doing so, the study 
subscribes to their key definitions which are as follows (Carter and Little, 2007): 
 Epistemology. It is defined as the study of the nature of knowledge and 
justification; and epistemological imperatives are issues about an adequate 
theory of knowledge or justification. 
 Methodology. It is the theory and analysis of how research should proceed; 
analysis of the assumptions, principles, and procedures in a particular approach 
to inquiry; or study – the description, the explanation, and the justification – of 
methods, and not the methods themselves; reconstructed reasons that justify, 
clarify, and help us understand research methods; methodology aims to justify 
the method of a research project. 
 Method. It is the techniques of gathering evidence; procedures, tools and 
techniques of research; methods are the bolt and nuts in research action.  
The preceding definitions assist in justifying the selection of a particular research 
design and research methodology (Babbie and Mouton, 2012, Carter and Little, 2007). 
Due to the complex nature of the SA Navy project management process the 
reductionism approach will be appropriate.  
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3.2 APPLICATION OF REDUCTIONISM IN THE STUDY 
Reductionism is the thinking that things must be broken down into smaller pieces in 
order to understand them. Reductionism denotes any approach to clarification that aim 
to reduce complexities of structure or behaviour to less complex units (Baxter and 
Jack, 2008, Eisenhardt, 1989, Handel, 1992, Merriam, 1998, Yin, 1994).  
Reductionism also has a particular meaning, and according to Kaplan (1964) human 
behaviour can be condensed to physical laws related to the instinctive type of 
behaviour of other animals to intensively investigate emergent properties and 
categories and their interactions within complex and dynamic social systems. The 
current study is conducted within a complex environment whereby there are various 
stakeholders such as the end user, the government, the public and the defence related 
industry among others. With the application of reductionism the complexity will be 
minimised.  Therefore, reductionism is relevant to this study as the study is exploratory 
in nature and the analysis will be enhanced.     
According to Ackoff (1972) reductionism consists of the believe that everything in this 
world and all knowledge thereof can be decomposed, reduced, or stripped to a simple 
indivisible or element parts. Ackoff further states that reductionism gives rise to a 
systematic way of thinking about the world, a means of looking for explanation and 
gaining understanding of it.  
Reductionism therefore is understood as the traditional way of approaching problem 
solving, at least in the great scheme, and it is common across numerous disciplines. 
Jackson (2005) provides a valuable outline for the supporting of reductionism. 
Reductionism can be labelled many names including among others “stepwise 
refinement”, “disaggregation” and simply “breaking the problem down”. According to 
Jackson (2005) in reductionism problems are broken down into simpler parts and are, 
possibly, reconstructed into a single whole solution or give a single systemic 
understanding. Alternatively, the individual sub problems can gain fairly self-contained 
answers with no reference to other parts of the understanding of the problem. 
Reductionism is the paradigm of understanding that has been used by the human race 
in a number of various scenarios with countless achievements. This knowledge of 
breaking problems into their fundamental pieces comes naturally to people and goes 
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some way towards relieving the burden of bounded rationality (O’Loughlin and 
McFadzean, 1999). That is, there are some huge/difficult challenges, concepts or 
issues than can only be correctly understood by first subdividing them into their basic 
parts. With this method there is an implicit assumption that there is little necessity or 
effort to understand the context or ‘whole’ systems or problem. Reductionism on the 
other hand failed to account for dynamics in organisms in the field of biology where it 
was obvious that the whole, which is the organism, cannot be understood only through 
the behaviour of its fundamental part (Flood, 2010). The organism as a whole took a 
form that is not comprehensible from its integral parts or to state it differently the whole 
was bigger than its inseparable parts. This occurrence where the whole emerged from 
the interface between the individual parts and the parts affecting each other in a 
network relationship is called emergence by Jackson (2003). When reductionism failed 
to deal with emergence, the general systems thinking was formulated (Bertalaffy and 
Woodger, 1338). As a result of this failure, general systems thinking was developed 
as a counter to reductionism and in reply to the need for knowledge generation and 
understanding phenomena takes interrelatedness and emergence into consideration 
(Flood, 2010). 
3.3 SYSTEMS THINKING AS A SUBSTITUTE TO REDUCTIONISM  
This research aims to identify and analyse factors hindering project success in the SA 
Navy. It is important to note that these factors are very diverse and come from multiple 
stakeholders as mentioned earlier. These factors are interrelated and are part of a 
bigger system which has various stakeholders. Stakeholders are among others the 
public, the end user, government, unions, defence industries, and the international 
organisations. It is against this background that the author proposes a systems’ 
approach in addressing the research problem. Although there are multiple 
stakeholders, only members of the SA Navy and ARMSCOR will form part of the 
research. This will be the end user of the system and personnel supporting the system 
such as logistics and intelligence. 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, a biologist somewhere in the 1940s, is widely recognised for 
the development of the general systems theory in an effort to incorporate the 
universality of science and generate a shared language across disciplines as an 
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alternative to reductionism (Ackoff, 1974, Jackson, 2000). A system can be defined as 
a set of interconnected elements (subsystem) operating as a whole (Wilson, 1984). In 
light of this, the SA Navy can be taken as a system that operates in a specific 
environment. The SA Navy is neither independent nor self-reliant. It shares resources 
with and it is reliant on the outside environment where it functions.   
The key features of systems thinking is centred around the whole system or organism 
instead of just the part (Nicholas and Steyn, 2012). It implies being able to observe the 
system in a condition, to take a seemingly disordered, confused condition and see 
some degree of order or harmony in it. As such, it is a valuable way of dealing with an 
intricate phenomena, particularly human created systems (Nicholas and Steyn, 2012).  
Individuals depending on the environment will define system differently. For someone 
in the information technology industry a system means a computer, for the mechanic 
it means an engine or a car, for a government employee a system means bureaucracy 
or administrative system and for the Navy it means weapon system. 
When one explains the system theory and present the SA Navy as an independent 
system, four fundamental notions must be clear: an open system (as opposed to 
closed system), subsystem, entropy and synergy. According to Smit et al. (2014) a 
system is closed when it is independent and can exist self-sufficiently in a specific 
setting. However, the system is open if:  
 it is reliant on the environment in which it operates, and the SA Navy is reliant 
on the Ministry of Defence for resources such as budget and equipment,  
 the environment is dependent on the system, because the Ministry of Defence 
is dependent on the SA Navy to protect the territorial waters of the Republic 
and fulfil its constitutional obligation; and 
 there is a specific interface between the environment and the system.  
The SA Navy is therefore a subsystem, i.e. a system within a system (the broader 
Department of Defence). The systems approach to research provides a framework in 
which numerous organisational subsystems can be considered individually, but also 
in terms of the whole organisation. A specific value of the systems approach is that it 
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highlights the fact that the actions in one fragment of an organisation influence 
activities in the other part. The system approach also infers that the SA Navy is an 
open system which has an explicit connection with its environment.  
As alluded to earlier the theory of open system was developed by von Bertalanffy 
(1950). The open system theory employs relational and functional and relational 
measures to study the whole, rather than principles of reductionism of studying the 
simple element. An organism as a whole is said to coexist in relation to an 
environment. Open systems take inputs from their environments, change them and 
then return them in the form of output or product back to the environment (Jackson, 
2003). In order for them to exist they are reliant on the environment and adjust to the 
environmental change.  
Synergy is the other notion of the system theory that can be applied to research.  It 
basically implies that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, or the individual 
subsystems are concurrently applied in such a way that the results of their 
simultaneous application is greater than the sum of their individual effort (Smit et al., 
2014).  One last concept of the system is called entropy which is the process of 
systems disintegration and it is the opposite of synergy. When the system fails to make 
the needed changes or provisions to allow it to remain its existence in a specific 
environment, it is bound to fragment and fail (Jackson, 2005). For the purpose of 
systems thinking, a systematic approach will be followed in this research.  
If one follows a recipe of baking cakes in a chronological manner then one is being 
systematic. Student mechanics in class take a systematic method to their study of the 
engine – the starter, brakes, clutch and lights among others – but on completion of 
their study the students may possess very little knowledge or even understanding of 
the entire engine because the whole differs from the sum of its parts, that is, the whole 
has emergent properties as depicted in Table 3.1. Many individuals either indirectly or 
indirectly mention things that are interrelated (exhibit connectivity – see Table 3.1) 
when referring to the term “system”. A common instance is the use of a “transport 
system” or “computer system” in daily language. Over and above a set of unified 
‘things’ (elements), a ‘system’ can also be understood as a technique of thinking about 
the linkages (relationship) among things – hence a process (Ison, 2008). A constraint 
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to think about ‘system’ as a process and as an object is activated by the fact that the 
word system is a noun – a noun refers to something one can see, touch or feel, but in 
modern systems thinking further care is paid to the process of ‘formulating’ a system 
as shown in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 demonstrates somebody who has articulated or 
distinguished a system of interest in a situation that is a process. In the process a 
boundary judgement is made which differentiates an environment from a system of 
interest.  
  
Figure 3.1:  Key elements of systems practice as a process which result from systems 
thinking within situations experienced as complex  (Ison, 2008) 
Systems thinking embraces a number of concepts which most systems lineages have 
as a common grounding (Table 3.1). Thus, like other academic areas, ‘systems’ has 
its own language, as shown in Table 3.1. At this point it is worth mentioning that the 
word system has been used in a number of different ways: firstly, in the daily sense 
when one mentions ‘problem with the system’; secondly, ‘system’ of interest which is 
the product of a process of formulating or constructing by someone as shown in Figure 
3.1; Thirdly, in the academic field of study called ‘systems’ and fourthly, a systems 
approach – practice or thinking which encompasses both systematic and systemic 
thinking and action (Ison, 2008). 
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Concept  Definition  Source 
Boundary The system’s borders, determined by the 
observer(s), which define a point where control 
action can be taken: a particular area of 
responsibility to achieve system purposes 
(Capra, 1996) 
Communication (i) The first-order communication is based on 
simple feedback (equally to a regulator) but 
must not be confused with human 
communication, which has a biological basis 
 
(ii) The second-order communication is viewed 
from a theory of cognition which includes 
emotion, language, perception and behaviour. 
Amongst human beings this gives rise to new 
properties in the communicating partners who 
each have different experiential histories 
(Wilson, 1984) 
Connectivity Rational dependence among elements or 
components (including subsystems) within a 
system 
(Wilson, 1984) 
Difficulty A condition is considered to be a bounded and 
well-articulated difficulty where it is presumed 
that it is clear who is involved and what would 
constitute a resolution within a given time frame 
(Pearson and 
Ison, 1997) 
Emergent 
properties 
Properties which are exposed at a certain stage 
of the organisation and which are not 
possessed by basic subsystems. Therefore 
these properties appear from an assembly of 
subsystems 
(Capra, 1996) 
Environment That which is on the outside of the system 
border and which affects and is also affected by 
(Wilson, 1984) 
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the system’s behaviour; otherwise the ‘context’ 
for a system of interest 
Feedback A form of interconnectedness is found in a 
varied variety of systems. There may be a 
negative feedback (balancing or 
compensatory) or positive (reinforcing or 
exaggerating) 
(Wilson, 1984) 
Hierarchy Layered structure; the position of a specific 
system in a range of levels of organisation. This 
implies that systems are at the same time a 
subsystem of some broader system and they 
are themselves a wider system to its 
subsystems 
(Capra, 1996) 
Measure of 
performance 
The standards used to measure whether the 
system achieve its intended purpose. The 
collected data according to performance 
measures, are used to adapt the interactions 
within the system    
(Pearson and 
Ison, 1997) 
Mess This is a set of circumstances that produces 
dissatisfaction. It can be conceptualised as a 
system of opportunities or problems; an 
opportunity or problem is a final element 
abstracted from a mess 
(Pearson and 
Ison, 1997) 
Controlling and 
Monitoring  
The collected data and the decisions taken in 
relation to performance measures are 
controlled and monitored. If there is any action 
required it will be taken through some 
management avenue. 
(Wilson, 1984) 
Networks An explanation of the concept of hierarchy 
which evades the human projection of ‘below’ 
and ‘above’ and recognises an assemblage of 
(Capra, 1996) 
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objects in relationship, for example an 
organisms in an ecosystem 
Perspective This is a way of experiencing which is moulded 
by our unique personal and social histories, 
where experiencing is a mental or cognitive act 
(Wilson, 1984) 
Purpose What the system is doing or why its exist; the 
raison d’être which in terms of a model 
developed by people is to achieve the particular 
transformation that has been defined 
(Capra, 1996) 
Resources Available elements within the system boundary 
and which enable the transformation to occur 
(Wilson, 1984) 
System An integrated whole whose essential properties 
arise from the relationships between its parts; 
from the Greek synhistanai, meaning ‘to place 
together’ 
Capra, 1996) 
System of 
interest 
The product of distinguishing a system in a 
situation, in relation to an articulated purpose, 
in which an individual or a group has an interest 
(a stake); a constructed or formulated system, 
of interest to one or more people, used in a 
process of inquiry; a term suggested to avoid 
confusion with the everyday use of the word 
‘system’ 
(Wilson, 1984) 
Systemic 
thinking 
The understanding of a phenomenon within the 
context of a larger whole; to understand things 
systemically literally means to put them into a 
context, to establish the nature of their 
relationships 
(Capra, 1996) 
Systematic 
thinking 
Thinking which is connected with parts of a 
whole but in a linear, step-by-step manner 
(Pearson and 
Ison, 1997) 
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Tradition Literally, a network of pre-understandings or 
prejudices from which we think and act; how we 
make sense of our world 
(Pearson and 
Ison, 1997) 
Transformation Changes, modelled as an interconnected set of 
activities which convert an input to an output 
which may leave the system (a ‘product’) or 
become an input to another transformation 
(Pearson and 
Ison, 1997) 
Worldview That view of the world which enables each 
observer to attribute meaning to what is 
observed (sometimes the German word 
Weltanschauung is used synonymously) 
(Capra, 1996) 
Table 3.1: Definitions of some generalised systems concepts likely to be experienced 
when encountering a system practitioner or for co-option into own action research  
There is a relationship between systems thinking and action research. There are two 
main lines of thought in systems thinking that lead to different conceptions about action 
research. The first is that systems thinking support thinking about real social systems 
that it assumes exist in the world (Wilson, 1984). The second is that systemic thinking 
supposes only that the social construction of the world is systemic (Pearson and Ison, 
1997). Greater emphasis is placed on systemic thinking consistent with its greater 
importance to contemporary action research. Systemic thinking when taken to its 
practical conclusion from a critical perspective offers to action research a somewhat 
unique liberating praxis (Pearson and Ison, 1997). 
3.4 SYSTEMS THINKING APPLIED TO FACTORS HINDERING PROJECT 
SUCCESS 
It is quite obvious that factors hindering project success in the SA Navy will at times 
be subjective, depending on an individual’s experience and encounters. These factors 
hindering project success could impact on one or more project objectives. These 
factors can be interrelated hence the proposal of systems approach. As mentioned 
earlier the problem with this study is the multiple stakeholders involved and the 
complexity of managing defence projects. This is described by Jackson and Keys 
(1984) as systemic-pluralist and mention problem-solving methodologies seeking to 
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address conflict arising from multiple purpose (pluralist) and the interdependency of 
the problem (systemic). This study proposes a soft systems approach specifically 
Warfield’s Interactive Management. A soft systems approach will address the 
interrelatedness and emergence properties of factors hindering project success while 
accommodating multiple stakeholders.  
3.5 ACTION RESEARCH 
Developments in systems thinking and practice have gone on in parallel – sometimes 
with mutual influences, sometimes in isolation – with other academic trends such as 
the emergence of discourse theory or post-structuralism or concerns with reflexivity, 
to name but a few (Ison, 2008). This should not pose problems for action researchers; 
it should rather offer more choices for practice. Awareness of the different systems 
traditions, the praxes that have evolved, their constituent concepts (Table 3.1) and the 
techniques, tools and methods that are used are all available for an action researcher 
to enhance their own repertoire. One of the key concepts in systems is that of hierarchy 
or layered structure (Table 3.1); this concept illuminates an important aspect of 
systems practice, the conscious movement between different levels of abstraction 
(Ison, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.2: A model of different influences that have shaped contemporary systems 
approaches (Ison, 2008) 
 
 
41 
  
Many action researchers, including Kurt Lewin, have been influenced by systems 
thinking, but what is not always clear is the extent to which this is done purposefully –
with awareness of the different theoretical and practical lineages depicted in Figure 
3.2. Engaging with systems offers a set of conceptual tools which can be used to good 
effect in action research (e.g. Table 3.1). There are other potential advantages for 
action research practitioners. Firstly, systemic understandings enable reflections on 
the nature of research practice, including action research practice itself. This can be 
understood by exploring purpose (Table 3.1). Secondly, there is a rich literature of how 
different systems approaches or methodologies, including systems tools and 
techniques, have been employed within action research to bring about practical 
benefits for those involved (Checkland and Poulter, 2006). 
 
Figure 3.3: The cycle of action research based on a declared framework of ideas (F) 
and methodology (M) and area of application (A) and articulated research themes: 
(Checkland and Holwell, 1998a, Holwell, 2004) 
The distinctions between what constitutes research (within the phrase action research) 
and how it might be differentiated from ‘inquiry’ or ‘managing’ is contested. Action 
research has been a concern within the ‘applied systems’ lineage (Figure 3.2) for over 
30 years (Checkland and Holwell, 1998a); within this lineage (Holwell, 2004) proposes 
three concepts that constitute action research as legitimate research: recoverability, 
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iteration, and the purposeful articulation of research themes (Figure 3.3). According to 
the cycle in Figure 3.3, a researcher interested in a specific research theme, 
pronounces early his\her framework of a linked idea (F) and methodology (M) and then 
enters into a real world situation whereby the research themes are pertinent and 
he/she becomes involved as a researcher and a participant (Holwell, 2004). According 
to Checkland and Holwell (1998a) action is taken in the real world situation whereby 
the researcher is committed to continuously reflect on the collaborative process and 
outcome of the activity. Howell exemplifies the claims with a description of ‘a program 
of action research with the prime research objective of understanding the nature of the 
contracting relationship [within the United Kingdom National Health Service] with a 
view to defining how it could be improved’. The project was ‘complex in execution, 
including several projects overlapping in time’ covering work from different bodies of 
knowledge, and was undertaken by a seven-member multidisciplinary team with 
different intellectual traditions. The issues explored crossed many organisational 
boundaries; the work was done over a four-year-period and followed a three-part 
purposeful but emergent design (Checkland and Holwell, 1998b). Within the 
Checkland and Holwell lineage they emphasise that the research process must  
(i) be recoverable by interested outsiders – ‘the set of ideas and the process 
in which they are used methodologically must be stated, because these are 
the means by which researchers and others make sense of the research’ 
(Holwell, 2004);  
(ii) involve the researcher’s interests embodied in themes which are not 
necessarily derived from a specific context. ‘Rather, they are the longer 
term, broader set of questions, puzzles, and topics that motivate the 
researcher [and] such research interests are rarely confined to one-off 
situations’ (Holwell, 2004);  
(iii) involve iteration, which is a key feature of rigor, something more complex 
than repetitions of a cycle through stages ‘if thought of in relation to a set of 
themes explored over time through several different organizational contexts’ 
(Holwell, 2004); and  
(iv) involve the ‘articulation of an epistemology in terms of which what will count 
as knowledge. 
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The action research process described in this study is the one frequently adopted by 
practitioners conducting academic research. According to Dick (2001) one pursues 
both action (change) and research (understanding) while conducting action research. 
Action research incorporates critical reflection on the action to gain better 
understanding that the result is a more informed action. Action research is usually 
participative and qualitative although quantitative methods have been used by some 
of the researchers when the situation demanded it (Sankaran et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 3.4: General model of action research (Sankaran et al., 2010) 
As shown in Figure 3.4 that action research is carried out in a spiral fashion. The most 
common form used by researchers is the Deakin cycle (Kemmis and McTaggart, 1988) 
of plan-act-observe and reflect and then the cycle repeats itself. Often one starts with 
the problem and as one takes action, observes and reflects on the situation you 
converge through an interactive cycle to a better understanding of the situation. Action 
research was selected as a research methodology as the researcher wants to pursue 
action outcomes and at the same time to address the problem statement. The 
research requires active participation of all stakeholders making the action research 
useful.  
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This research aims to identify and analyse factors hindering project success in the SA 
Navy. The author proposes a systemic process of identifying and analysing these 
factors. This study will adopt Checkland and Holwell (1998a) cycle of action research 
as a research approach.  
3.6 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
In view of Checkland and Holwell (1998a) cycle of action research, the research 
theme, framework and methodology for this study are as follows. 
3.6.1 Research Theme 
The theme for this study can be specified as: What are the key factors hindering project 
success in the SA Navy? 
3.6.2 Framework 
Systemic thinking is proposed for this study as a guiding framework. Factors hindering 
project success are not only one sided as there are multiple stakeholders in SA Navy 
projects.   
3.6.3 Methodology 
This section presents methodological practices that seek to describe, explain and 
justify the methods used in research and is not a method in itself (Kaplan, 1964). To 
put it figuratively, the methodological practitioner is neither a ‘baseball commissioner 
who writes rules’ nor ‘umpire with powers to thump offenders’ but a ‘coach whose 
recommendations’ rest “on what the play of the game shows to be effective” (Kaplan, 
1964). In other words, the task of research methodology is usually inquiring about 
techniques and/or logical principles as “the ways of doing the work of that science 
which are regarded, for more or less compelling reasons, as being acceptable” 
(Kaplan, 1964). Kaplan also presents that methodological studies also seek to 
establish the potentialities and limitations of various techniques or probes of some of 
its alternatives. One must also confess that this section is viewed as a “retreat to a 
previously prepared line of defense against criticism of the substantive outcome of the 
inquiry” (Kaplan, 1964). The study undertakes not to use this section to advance any 
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‘scientific honorifics’, but affirms the proper concerns of methodologies to be used and 
their standards of scientific acceptability. Kaplan (1964) warns that any attempt to 
press methodological norms too far, may obscure imaginative and bold explorations 
of unresolved mysteries.  
 
This study will employ an interactive management approach. Interactive management 
is a specialised system of management using collaborative teamwork to define and 
resolve highly complex issues (Alexander, 2002). Warfield and Cárdenas (1994) 
explained:  
The development of interactive management is based on the recognition that 
for coping with complex situations there is a need for a group of persons, 
knowledgeable of the situation, to tackle together the main aspects of the 
concern, to develop a keen understanding of the situation under analysis and 
to elaborate the basis for effective action; all these founded in a spirit of 
collaboration, commitment and within the framework of a serious and organised 
effort. 
The notion of interactive management was developed by Warfield and Christakis at 
the University of Virginia in 1980 (Banathy, 1996) and has been used successfully in 
larger groups facing crisis situations (Warfield and Cárdenas, 1994). Interactive 
management is structured to avoid situations that lead deliberations to flounder; it 
creates a situation whereby a democratic decision through consensus can be arrived 
at by all the participants, not just the majority, by developing a pattern created by the 
dialogue (Warfield and Cárdenas, 1994). In that way, participants are not persuaded 
to settle to a substandard decision just to be able to see some action and to get on to 
other tasks demanding their attention.  
The researcher will identify roles of the IM process as suggested by (Warfield and 
Cárdenas, 1994). For the purpose of this research IM participants will be carefully 
selected to have broad stakeholder representation. Participants will comprise of 
project officers, those utilising the systems like ships, representatives from ARMSCOR 
and procurement group. In total there will be a maximum of seven participants. This is 
in line with Janes (1988) suggestion that a group of participants should be limited to a 
maximum of eight members. Janes further states that increasing the group size above 
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this number will weaken the quality of debate. Participants will be selected according 
to the different projects they worked on or are currently busy with.  
The key participator during IM is the facilitator. The role of the facilitator is to plan the 
IM workshop, select participants, and most importantly organise the venue for the 
interaction. A triggering question will be used to generate ideas from participants. 
Participants will be asked to identify factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. 
These ideas or factors identified will be gathered and will serve as an input in the idea 
clarification stage.  
Once ideas are collected individuals will clarify factors hindering project success. Once 
these factors are identified participants will be invited to discuss each factor to aid 
understanding. The researcher as a facilitator will listen to the discussion and record 
ideas in order to condense them into a single thought.   
During the IM process the researcher identifies the participants, the information and 
the facility requirements. Warfield and Cárdenas (1994) highlighted that a critical 
purpose is to make sure that the participants’ time is used productively in the IM 
workshop. Warfield and Cárdenas (1994) further states that before ideas are 
generated there must be an identification of the complex issues or problem, the 
framing of the problem, awareness of potential alternative signs, selection of design 
and the the process of implementation of the selected design. After stipulating the 
action research subject, outline, procedure, and concerned area, the action process 
will be as follows:  
3.6.4 Interactive Management Process 
Various roles for the IM process were identified by (Warfield and Cárdenas, 1994). It 
is given that resources are always limited and for the purpose of this research the 
following roles are regarded as relevant: 
a. The IM participants: These are stakeholders in the issue under investigation 
of study. In the interest of fairness, all key stakeholder groups must be 
represented in the participants to avoid compromising the IM process. It is a 
fact that one will get substantive information from participants who are 
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knowledgeable about the problem situation.  Jackson (2003) describes various 
roles of different players. As stakeholder groups described by Jackson (2003), 
Table 3.2 identifies stakeholders for this research.  
Stakeholder 
Group 
Description Designation for this 
research  
Number of 
participants 
Decision-
makers 
Decision-makers are able 
to influence and make 
things happen in the 
system.  
The Military Command 
Council or their 
representative. 
Management from 
ARMSCOR.  
One 
Actors 
customers 
and client 
Actors perform basic tasks 
while customers and 
clients suffer or benefit 
from the system. 
Commanders of Ships 
and Engineers.  
Two 
Problem 
owners 
Problem owners are 
concerned about the 
system’s performance. 
The logistics officers in 
the SA Navy. 
One 
Witness Finesses are affected by 
the system but cannot 
influence the behaviour of 
the system.   
The combat officer in 
the SA Navy and 
technician 
Two 
Problem-
solvers 
Problem-solvers are 
responsible to solve the 
problem. 
Project officers. One 
Table 3.2: The identified stakeholders for the study 
 
In the IM workshop the identified members will assist in providing the necessary 
information. Once the information is provided members or participants will then provide 
feedback based on the generated model and identify the relationship.  
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b. The IM Facilitator (the researcher) is responsible to plan the workshop, select 
the participants, ensure that the discussion is facilitated in a fair manner and 
interpret the results of the Interpretive Structural Modelling (ISM) model.  
First in the IM process is the idea generation. The generation of ideas is a process to 
draw any system’s element from stakeholders (Nthunya et al., 2016). In this phase the 
participants are conversant about the situation and they are brought together with the 
guidance of the IM practitioner to generate ideas (Jackson, 2003). Various methods 
can be used to generate ideas such as the Nominal Group Technique and Delphi 
Technique to mention but a few. For the purpose of this study, the idea generation 
process will be done in a form of a triggering question. Participants will be asked to 
name at least seven factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. This will be 
done on paper to protect the identity of the participants. The researcher will then go 
through identified factors to eliminate any repetition. The identified factors will be used 
as input into the idea clarification stage. Participants will be given an opportunity to 
generate ideas on their own time and space. The generated ideas will give participants 
an understanding of other perception of the problem (Nthunya et al., 2016). At this 
stage the participants will frame a consensual understanding of the problem and 
respond to the triggering questions. Warfield and Cárdenas (1994) and (Christakis, 
2000) stated that there are two reasons why it is necessary that participants become 
familiar with what the patterns convey, namely: (a) to assure the quality of the display 
by either verifying its accuracy as presented initially or by amending it appropriately, 
and (b) to enable them to convey an interpretation of the structure to others who may 
also lack the capacity to interpret the structures.  The above process may be 
summarised as follows: 
i. Clarifying the triggering question; 
ii. generation of ideas silently in writing by each participant;  
iii. recording of ideas on the board; and 
iv. discussion of each idea for clarification and editing as discussed in the next 
section. 
Once ides are identified they must then be clarified. Participants sometimes use the 
same words to convey different concepts, or use different words to convey the same 
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concepts (Nthunya et al., 2016). Because of this, the IM process will clarify each 
generated idea in ensuring unambiguity in the extracted information. This is where 
generated ideas are checked and rephrased if required. The Nominal Group 
Technique may be used to select important elements of the modelling (Nthunya et al., 
2016). After the clarification of ideas and any new additions are made during the 
clarification discussion, participants can be asked to vote by means of a written ballot 
(Warfield and Cárdenas, 1994). During this voting process each participant can be 
given an opportunity to choose the five ideas deemed to be important in respect to the 
issue and they are ranked in the order of importance (Warfield and Cárdenas, 1994).  
 
On completion of the idea clarification the idea structuring will begin. The idea 
structuring phase can be done with the aid of a binary matrix (Nthunya et al., 2016). 
Once a set of evidently pronounced elements is available, these ideas will be 
structured into patterns. This is a computer operation process and during this phase 
the computer operator must manually keep track of the answers given by the group in 
order to be able to amend any changes should the need arise later. In this phase 
participants will examine the relationship between a pair of system elements.  
 
For the purpose of this study the (ISM) will be used to structure factors hindering 
project success in the SA Navy as identified during the idea generation and 
clarification stage. The ISM assists to frame elements linked with issue formulation. 
The ISM is a useful tool when dealing with complexity where there is interrelatedness 
between elements associated with the complex situation. According to Warfield and 
Cárdenas (1994) the ISM is capable of adapting the poorly defined view about the 
problem or the situation. The discussion is used to investigate the structure and 
relations between the elements. The ISM will therefore be a supporting mechanism 
for the workshop participants for structuring ideas and sharing their knowledge.  This 
is the phase where the output is reviewed thorough the IM process. The graphs 
emerging from IM activities are interpreted. Participants are allowed to change the 
voting records during the interpretation process (Nthunya et al., 2016). The generated 
model, although not conclusive, can be utilised to develop an action plan.  
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According to Iyer and Sagheer (2009) the ISM is based on two basic concepts which 
are 
 one, identified sets of elements within a situation context and  
 two, a contextual relation is chosen as a possible statement or relationship 
among elements. For the purpose of this study, an influence type relationship 
will be used. The participants will be requested to respond to pairwise 
comparison in order to identify the interacting position of each factor. For 
example, does factor A significantly lead to factor B? 
Once elements are identified and the contextual relationship is defined, pairwise 
comparison is then used to determine the subordination relation between elements 
(Warfield, 1973). According to (Warfield, 1973) the subordination relations are 
encoded in an n x n systems matrix where n represents the number of elements 
identified. The ISM uses the discrete mathematics of logic and structure (including 
binary relations, set theory, matrix theory, graph theory and Boolean algebra) which is 
mainly appropriate for representing systems described in terms of elements and 
relations (Janes, 1988).  
Complex structures are well represented in the form of a graph or diagraph. In the ISM 
the elements of the issue or problem being studied are represented by the vertices of 
the diagraph, whereas the edges are directed and denote a specific relation between 
the elements, for example: 
 
Element        Relation 
1. Strong project leadership      -would help to achieve 
2. Insufficient funds       -strongly contributes to 
3. Clear project objective     -would help to achieve 
4. Dysfunctional leadership     -significantly aggravate  
5. Lack of technical expertise     -would lead to 
6. Poor project structure     -would influence 
7. Poor stakeholders engagement    -would influence the 
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8. Lack of autonomy by project managers    -would lead to 
 
Figure 3.5: Example of a diagraph representing the example above (Janes, 1988) 
The circle represents objectives and arrows the phrase (e.g. would help to achieve). 
By inserting the wording of the elements in place of the numbered circles will provide 
a well-defined structural model based on words and diagraph which can easily be 
communicated (Janes, 1988). The good thing about the ISM is that it can be used in 
any complex situation irrespective of the content of the situation, but, this is on 
condition that the set of elements can be identified with appropriate contextual 
relations defined.  
This study will utilise ISM computer software by Sorach International called Concept 
Star to structure the identified factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. The 
end product of the ISM process will be a model showing how the  identified factors 
interrelate. The ISM software enables the researcher to enter a set of elements into 
the computer whereby a group is asked to respond to a series of questions put out by 
the computer. For example does factor X significantly lead to factor Z?  The group 
discuss the question under the guidance of the facilitator and a “yes” or “no” answer 
is agreed upon. When the group vote “yes” a “1” is entered in the appropriate cell of a 
matrix in the computer and with a “no” vote a “0” is entered. The constructed binary 
matrix represents a binary relation of a set in itself (Janes, 1988). In the process the 
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computer will make logical inference, based on given answers which leads to the 
construction of a system matrix as shown in Figure 3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6: Example of a systems matrix of a four element set (Janes, 1988) 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FNDINGS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided an overview of the methodology used in the study. The 
aim of this chapter is to discuss and analyse the research findings of the study. The 
findings will be derived from the IM model developed during the workshop.  
4.2 DATA COLLECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF STAKEHOLDERS 
As a point of departure in this study, a triggering question was posed to the participants 
to generate ideas during the IM process. To protect participants’ identity, each IM 
participant was given a piece of paper to generate factors hindering project success 
in the SA Navy (See appendix A). A total of 134 factors were generated by participants. 
The IM facilitator collected all papers from the participants and transferred /wrote those 
factors on a white board. Interestingly, there were huge similarities in the factors 
identified by participants. The IM facilitator took the IM participants through each 
identified factor for clarity. In the end only 17 factors were left for discussion. Other 
factors were either merged or removed because they were either similar or the 
participants agreed that they have no substance.  
A total of seven members participated in the workshop. Participation was broadly 
representative of various stakeholders. It is very important to have a diverse 
stakeholder representation in the IM workshop otherwise the quality of the IM output 
could be compromised (Warfield and Cárdenas, 1994). Participation involved, the 
representative of the Military Command Council from ARMSCOR, logistics officer, an 
engineer, commander of a ship, a combat officer, a technician, and project officer as 
depicted in Table 3.2 (Chapter 3 of the study). The defence related industry’s 
participation could not be included and the member was not available at the time of 
the workshop. The study was undertook to ensure that the ISM group size was met as 
proposed by Janes (1995) and the representation requirements as suggested by 
Warfield and Cárdenas (1994).  
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4.3 GENERATION CLARIFICATION OF IDEAS 
The participants were asked a triggering question as mentioned earlier to gather ideas 
on factors hindering project success in the SA Navy. Participants were also asked to 
give a description of each identified factor for the sake of clarity. In total, the 
participants identified 36 factors which were discussed extensively during the 
clarification stage. In the end the participants agreed on 17 factors as outlined in Table 
4.1.  
Although participants generated factors individually on a piece of paper to protect their 
anonymity, during the discussion they were able to share their ideas with each other 
and this made the facilitation process very easy for the researcher. All seven 
participants identified a high turnover rate of project officers’, lack of autonomy by 
project managers, budgetary constraints, poor planning, lack of top management 
support, bureaucratic procurement and acquisition process and poor project 
management.  
It is interesting to note that participants chose to differentiate between incompetent 
project managers and a lack of technical expertise by project managers. Although a 
lack of training contributes to both, one can be fully trained and still be incompetent. A 
lack of technical expertise is caused by a lack of training.  
Sixteen of the seventeen identified factors are found in the literature. It is interesting 
to note that participants never struggled to agree on these factors. The IM facilitation 
process was very easy as participants mostly agreed with each other. During the 
voting process participants agreed without any hassles. There was never a time in the 
voting process where participants differed on whether the answer should be yes or no.  
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Ref Factor Factor Description  Number of 
participants 
posing the 
factor 
Literature 
reference 
1 Incompetent 
project 
managers 
Due to a lack of training, 
project managers lack 
competency. A prior 
knowledge of project 
management or qualification 
is not a requirement to 
become a project manager in 
the SA Navy. 
Five (Belassi and 
Tukel, 1996, 
Helfrich, 
2016) 
2 Lack of top 
management 
support 
Top management are not 
standing up for the members. 
Not ensuring that resources 
required are available when 
needed.  
Seven (Avots, 1969, 
Belassi and 
Tukel, 1996, 
Helfrich, 
2016, Morris 
and Hugh, 
1986, Munns 
and Bjeirmi, 
1996, Pinto 
and Covin, 
1989, Preda, 
2013) 
3 Poor project 
management 
techniques 
Because members have no 
formal qualification and some 
have never worked on 
projects before, they display 
poor project management 
techniques. 
Four (Avots, 1969, 
Munns and 
Bjeirmi, 1996) 
4 Poor 
planning 
Not understanding project 
management planning 
Seven (Avots, 1969, 
Belassi and 
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 techniques. This is the results 
of lacking technical expertise. 
Tukel, 1996, 
Helfrich, 
2016, Munns 
and Bjeirmi, 
1996) 
5 Poor 
stakeholder 
engagement 
and analysis 
Inability to identify 
stakeholders and engage 
them accordingly. This ends 
up in projects being delayed 
or sometimes cancelled.  
Three (Demir, 2015, 
Preda, 2013) 
6 Unrealistic 
time frame 
Time frame that is optimistic 
rather than realistic.  
Six  
7 Budgetary 
constraints 
 
Funds are always limited and 
this impact on project 
success and sometimes 
projects has to be cancelled. 
Seven (Hagen et al., 
2012, Preda, 
2013) 
8 Lack of 
technical 
expertise by 
project 
managers 
Project managers come from 
different environments within 
the SA Navy and lack 
technical expertise due to a 
lack of training. Prior 
knowledge of project 
management is not a 
requirement to be appointed 
as a project manager in the 
SA Navy. 
Five (Tishler et al., 
1996) 
9 Lack of 
autonomy by 
project 
managers 
 
Due to command and control 
in the military, project 
managers have no autonomy 
in their projects. Their 
decisions can be overruled by 
their superiors.  
Seven (Tatar, 2010) 
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10 Too much 
control from 
superiors 
Superiors have more powers 
over project managers and 
this result in excessive 
control at times. 
Five (Tatar, 2010) 
11 High 
turnover rate 
of project 
officers  
 
To be a project manager or 
officer is not a career in the 
Navy. Members will always 
seek promotions in higher 
posts outside the project 
environment. Others will even 
leave the Navy for high 
paying jobs in the private 
sector.  
Seven (Preda, 2013, 
Tatar, 2010, 
Tishler et al., 
1996) 
12 Poor risk 
management 
Members lack expertise to 
identify risks and to 
incorporate it in their plan. 
Four (Demir, 2015) 
13 Poor quality 
management 
Inability to plan and manage 
quality. 
Five (Demir, 2015) 
14 Complexity 
of design 
Defence projects are 
complex in their nature and 
require managers with 
technical expertise.  
Four (Demir, 2015) 
15 Inability to 
attract and 
retain talent 
The SA Navy is unable to 
attract highly qualified project 
managers. Once members’ 
have undergone training the 
SA Navy is unable to retain 
them as they are unable to 
match the salary being paid in 
the private sector.  
Three (Oueslati, 
2016) 
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16 Bureaucratic 
procurement 
and 
acquisition 
process 
Government procurement 
and acquisition regulations 
are very rigid and cannot be 
bypassed. They add delays in 
the approval process and 
sometimes even failure.   
Seven (Tatar, 2010, 
Tishler et al., 
1996) 
17 Poor project 
management 
The fact that project 
managers have no technical 
skills will result in poor project 
management.  
Seven  
Table 4.1 Factors hindering project success in the SA Navy identified by the 
participants 
4.4 INTERPRETIVE STRUCTURAL MODELLING 
The Concept Star as ISM software designed by Sorach International was used to 
create a hierarchical model of the identified factors hindering project success in the 
SA Navy. The 17 identified factors through the triggering question were loaded into 
the software in order to develop a model through pairwise comparison prompts as 
shown in Figure 4.1. 
The participants discussed each pairwise comparison in order to achieve an 
agreement on whether the response to the pairwise comparison statement was a yes 
or no. In Figure 4.1 there is an icon “next vote”. This can be used when participants 
failed to reach an agreement by skipping or deferring the comparison without giving 
an answer or it can also be used when participants reach consensus on the 
relationship between the posed elements. The pairwise comparison can also be 
presented again at a later stage. Should the participants fail to reach an agreement 
again, the response will be reached through a vote where the most supported 
response will be accepted. These two scenarios were never experienced in the 
workshop as there was always a consensus.  
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Figure 4.1 Voting screen taken from the Concept Star Software 
It took approximately two and half hours to complete 150 pairwise comparisons out of 
a possible 289. The Concept Star’s software logic used Transitive Logic to imply some 
of the relationships. The model that was produced was checked for inconsistencies 
and was accepted as the final ISM model for factors hindering project success in the 
SA Navy. 
4.5 MODEL ANALYSIS 
The relationship model in Figure 4.2 depicts the relationship between factors hindering 
project success in the SA Navy. Factors are shown in the boxes and the direction of 
the arrows illustrates the direction of the relationship between factors hindering project 
success. In this model the relationship represented is “Significantly aggravate”. Most 
factors are displayed in the individual boxes. There is no circular relationship in the 
model, e.g. A significantly aggravate B and B significantly aggravate C. The model is 
hierarchical where the left most items form the base of the hierarchy. The far right 
elements of the diagraph represent the factors with no influence on other factors.  
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Figure 4.2: ISM model of factors hindering project success in the SA Navy 
61 
 
The ISM model depicted in Figure 4.2 is made up of six hierarchical levels.  The first 
level on the left of the model indicates six factors as the primary key drivers for factors 
hindering project success:  
 Lack of top management support; 
 Lack of technical expertise by project managers; 
 Too much control from superiors; 
 High turnover rate of project officers; 
 Complexity of design; and  
 Inability to attract and retain talent. 
These primary drivers are not influenced or aggravated by other factors. Senge (1997) 
suggests that systemic thinking has revealed that small actions focussed on the right 
things or areas produce large and long-lasting improvements. Applying Senge’s 
statement to the SA Navy hierarchical model suggests that even by focusing on just 
the six key factors identified through the IM process – the project team could potentially 
realise the results further in other levels. It is worth noting that the factor “complexity 
of design” does not have a relationship with any factor. This means that this factor is 
not influenced by other factors and has no influence on any factor. It is worth 
mentioning that the complexity of the design factor will remain the Naval project 
environment factor as mentioned in the literature review as defence projects are very 
complex in their nature. The only remedy is to have project managers with strong 
technical expertise and who can handle and manage complexity. 
The findings from this study suggest that in order to derive the best benefit for the 
success of the SA Navy projects, the SA Navy needs to focus its attention on the 
following key factors: 
a. Lack of top management support. Lack of top management support 
in the model is only linked to two factors, bureaucratic procurement and 
acquisition process and budgetary constraints. Although budgetary 
constraints are not a primary driver according to the model, it is one of 
the key factors in any project. Without sufficient funding, no project will 
succeed. Without the top management’s support, the procurement and 
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acquisition processes cannot be bypassed. With strong motivation from 
the top management, government procurement and acquisition 
processes can be relaxed. 
 
b. Lack of technical expertise by project managers. Lack of technical 
expertise by project managers is the most aggravating factor in the model. 
This is the key factor hindering project success in the SA Navy the most. 
This factor influences nine factors out of seventeen factors as depicted by 
the model. A lack of technical expertise by project managers influences 
poor quality management, poor planning and poor risk management among 
others. A poor plan in project management will ultimately lead to poor 
project performance. It came out during the workshop that to be a project 
manager in the SA Navy, a formal qualification is not a requirement. Prior 
knowledge of project management is also not a requirement. Basically 
anyone wearing the SA Navy uniform can be utilised to manage projects. 
Once individuals are appointed to manage projects, only then will they be 
send on various courses for development. Participants mentioned that most 
project managers learn on the job.  
 
c. Too much control from superiors. Control is necessary to ensure that 
things happen accordingly but too much control can be problematic. 
According to the model, too much control by superiors made project 
managers to lack autonomy. The participants mentioned that even if project 
managers have different opinions than that of the superior, the superior will 
have more power to overrule any opinion from the junior. This is due to the 
command and control system of the Military. In the military, one needs to 
obey orders and failure to do so is punishable in the Military Court of Justice 
and could lead to a dismissal or punishment depending on its severity. 
According to the participants there is no sufficient independence of project 
officers to manage and decide on their projects. The participants felt that it 
will be a mammoth task to effectively address the problem of too much 
control from superiors. According to participants, too much control can also 
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be attributed to a lengthy approval process before projects can be 
implemented.   
 
d. High turnover rate of project officers.  A high turnover rate of project 
officers aggravates incompetence of project officers. This is due to the fact 
that new project officers have to be appointed and most of them have no 
prior knowledge of project management. It appeared during the workshop 
that being a project officer in the SA Navy is not considered a career. Project 
officers leave the project environment for more senior posts in the SA Navy. 
Other project officers (once gained experience and are more qualified) 
leave the SA Navy for a more lucrative job outside while others become 
consultants to the SA Navy where they earn more than what they were paid 
in the SA Navy. 
 
e. Complexity of design. The Navy projects are known for their complexity 
and always requiring sophisticated technology. The integration of various 
systems is very complex and requires a team that can manage complexity. 
The element complexity of design was found to have no connection with 
other elements. Most SA Navy projects designs require interfacing with 
other systems and according to the participants this put project delivery at 
the mercy of a third party. This often leads to project delays and the difficulty 
of dealing with the third party that SA Navy cannot control. The participants 
also mentioned that there is always an escalation in costs as a result of a 
third party.  
 
f. Inability to attract and retain talent. Inability to attract and retain talent 
leads to incompetent project managers. The participants mentioned that the 
SA Navy cannot compete with the market related salaries and as a result 
project managers are reluctant to remain in the SA Navy.  
 
The seven elements on the far right of the sixth level of the hierarchy namely, 
bureaucratic procurement and acquisition process, budgetary constraints, unrealistic 
timeframe, poor stakeholder engagement and analysis, poor risk management, poor 
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quality management and project managers lacking autonomy are the elements mostly 
influenced by others. They have no influence or impact on any other elements. This 
can be inferred that as long as other elements are properly addressed then the seven 
elements on level six will automatically be addressed. Table 4.2 indicate the first level 
of the hierarchy and a number of elements influenced by the first level. 
First level Element Number of elements 
influenced  
Complexity of design Zero element 
Inability to attract and retain talent One element 
High turnover rate of project officers One elements 
Lack of top management support Two elements 
Too much control from superiors Three elements 
Lack of technical expertise by project managers Nine elements 
Table 4.2 Summary of first level elements and a number of elements influenced by 
the first level 
4.6 COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS FROM RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are similarities between the literature review and the findings of this study. Many 
of the factors identified by the participants are found in the literature as discussed in 
Chapter 2 of the literature review. Although some of these factors are similar to the 
ones in the literature review, their impact on individual organisations will be different. 
Furthermore, the literature does not show the interrelationship between these factors. 
The study however, shows the interconnection between factors and how they affect 
each other and this makes the study unique and different.  
The study further found that poor quality management will hinder project success in 
the SA Navy. The literature is very unsubstantial on quality management in the Navy. 
A high turnover rate of project managers contributes to the challenge of managing and 
retaining talent in the SA Navy.  
The literature addresses complexity as one of the factors hindering project success in 
the SA Navy, but the findings specifically dealt with the complexity of design. It was 
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found that due to a lack of technical expertise complexity of design remains a 
challenge in the SA Naval project environment.  
4.7 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to present the results and analyse the IM model developed 
during the IM workshop. A total of 17 elements were analysed and the results indicated 
that for the SA Navy to achieve its project success the identified elements must be 
addressed. The most important elements are the ones on level one of the hierarchy. 
If these elements can be addressed the project success in the SA Navy will be 
realised. The next chapter will provide the conclusion and recommendation for the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH CONCLUSION 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The objective of this study was to analyse factors hindering project success in the SA 
Navy. The findings of the study suggest that there are various factors hindering project 
success in the SA Navy. Some of these factors are more severe than others and this 
was discussed in Chapter 4 during the analysis of the IM model. The study suggests 
that there is a lack or absence of top management support which is a cause for 
concern. The identified factors if not addressed will influence the success of the SA 
Navy projects and this will affect the operational readiness of the SA Navy.  
It was argued that the SA Navy is a system made up of multiple stakeholders 
generating their own purpose in projects. It came out that these factors hindering 
project success are systemic in nature and there is a clear interaction between them 
where one factor impacts on one or more other factors.  
This study used IM, a systemic approach whose support is participation, interpretation, 
learning and structural representation. Through the IM process 17 factors hindering 
project success were identified and modelled by using Sorach’s International Concept 
Star ISM software. The ISM tool was used to aid careful logical thinking around the 
complex issues in SA Navy’s projects. The ISM model revealed six factors as the key 
drivers hindering project success in the SA Navy. They are the critical point of 
departure for addressing the problem in the SA Navy’s projects. The IM process 
provided a very invaluable learning experience for both the researcher and the 
participants.  
5.2 REFLECTION ON THE PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem statement examined by this study was that there are a number of factors 
hindering project success in the SA Navy. A number of projects in the SA Navy hardly 
start or finish on time and some are abandoned in the process due to various 
challenges. The arms deal enquiry revealed that SA Navy is not sufficiently equipped 
to satisfy its mandate.  The problem statement also stated that the SA Navy spent 
billions of tax payers’ money on projects, but, the success of these projects is 
 
 
67 
  
questionable. The study revealed that there is a high turnover rate of project managers 
as project managers are sometimes promoted to higher ranks in the military. The study 
further revealed that there is a lack of top management support and there is also too 
much control from superiors. This leads to project managers lacking autonomy in 
decision-making. Project management in the SA Navy may be inadequate especially 
in light of the fact that command and control is at the order of the day in the military.  
5.3 REFLECTION ON THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The study was aimed at answering the following question and the findings are 
discussed below. “What are the factors hindering project success in the South 
African Navy?” 
To answer this question the researcher facilitated the IM workshop of seven 
participants. A total of 17 factors hindering project success were identified. The end 
result of the workshop was the IM model which indicated the six key factors among 
the seventeen identified factors which influence eleven other factors while they 
themselves were not influenced by any factors. These key factors are: 
 Lack of top management support,  
 Lack of technical expertise by project managers,  
 Too much control from superiors,  
 High turnover rate of project officers,  
 Complexity of design, and  
 Inability to attract and retain talent.  
Of particular interest is the factor “lack of technical expertise by project managers” 
which is the main key factor influencing the other nine factors. The study revealed that 
if all six of these factors can be successfully addressed it will lead to other factors 
being addressed. This will automatically lead to project success in the SA Navy.  
The study revealed that there is no set criterion to select project managers. Anyone in 
the SA Navy can be utilised in the project environment. It appeared that there is not a 
requirement for prior project background. This has a serious negative impact on 
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projects as it takes time to develop individuals to a level where they can independently 
manage projects.    
The study revealed that there is a high turnover rate of project managers in the SA 
Navy. It was revealed by participants that project officers sometimes leave the project 
environment to pursue other senior positions in the SA Navy. Others once attended 
courses and they are qualified leave the project environment to take up well paid jobs 
outside the SA Navy.  The IM model suggests that the high turnover rate leads to 
incompetent project managers as the organisation now has to start from the beginning 
to recruit and train new project managers.  
It appeared during the IM workshop that to manage a SA Navy project one requires 
the ability to deal with and manage complexity. An individual who can deal with 
ambiguity is the one who will succeed in SA Navy projects.  
5.4 LIMITATION OF RESEARCH 
 
Getting participants together was a challenge as they have obligations outside their 
offices. The participants’ job involved extensive travelling. A number of factors 
identified by participants were deemed classified and participants requested they not 
be included in the study. The researcher tried to have a broad representation of 
stakeholders but due to unavailability of more senior members the researcher was left 
with no choice but to use some junior members.  Warfield and Cárdenas (1994) 
suggested that the IM participants must include representatives from all key 
stakeholders groups. Although the study managed to get as many stakeholders as 
possible, the debate could have been improved or more robust with the participation 
of more senior members.  
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In view of this study, the following recommendations on the identified factors are 
provided to project management in the SA Navy:  
 Incompetent Project Managers: The SA Navy needs to deal with incompetence 
by ensuring that talented project managers are recruited. Once project 
 
 
69 
  
managers are recruited, they must be provided with training and this will lead 
to good quality planning, and sound project management techniques. 
 
 Lack of top management support: Top management need to play a leading role 
by supporting project manages. This will improve their commitment and lead to 
more members realising their worthiness. This will also ensure that resources 
are available and bureaucratic processes are reduced. 
 
 Lack of technical expertise by project managers: The only solution to this 
challenge is to recruit talented individuals and skill them accordingly. By 
recruiting talented individuals it will address the issue of poor project 
management techniques, poor risk management and poor quality management 
and in the end project managers will be competent. By improving technical 
expertise of project managers, they will be able to deal with complexity at all 
times. The SA Navy must be able to attract and retain talent to address this 
challenge. 
 
 High turnover rate of project officers: In order for the SA Navy to attract and 
retain talent it needs to pay market related salaries of its project officers. 
Managing projects in the SA Navy must be considered as a career and 
individuals must be well looked after in terms of benefits.  
 
 Complexity of design:  The complexity of design in defence projects is 
inevitable. The only way to deal with this is to appoint competent project 
managers who understand complexity and are able to deal with it. 
 
 Inability to attract and retain talent:  For SA Navy projects to be successful, 
competent and talented individuals must be recruited and retained. This will 
ultimately lead to competent project managers and planning will improve.  
 
 Too much control from superiors: Project managers must be given their 
independence to act and decide. 
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Appendix A: Individual response of factors hindering success in the SA Navy 
Participant 1 
1. Lack of technical expertise 
2. High turnover rate of project team 
3. Incompetent Project Managers 
4. Lack of top management support 
5. Poor project management techniques 
6. Poor planning 
7. Poor stakeholder engagement and analysis 
8. Unrealistic timeframe 
9. Budgetary constraints 
10. High turnover rate of project officers 
11. Poor risk management 
12. Poor quality management 
13. Complexity of design 
14. Inability to attract and retain talent 
15. Bureaucratic procurement and acquisition process 
16. Poor project management 
17. Project Managers lack autonomy 
18. Too much control from superiors 
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Participant 2 
1. Lack of planning 
2. Inability to analyse stakeholders 
3. Budget  
4. Timeframe not real 
5. Poor project management techniques 
6. Lack of top management support 
7. Design complexity 
8. Control from superiors 
9. Lack of technical expertise 
10. High turnover rate of project team 
11. Politics Incompetent Project Managers 
12. Turnover rate of project officers 
13. Poor quality and risk management 
14. Inability to attract and retain talent 
15. Poor procurement and acquisition process 
16. Poor project management 
17. Project Managers lack independence 
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Participant 3 
1. Lack of top management support 
2. Poor project management techniques 
3. Budget cuts 
4. High turnover rate of project officers 
5. Poor risk  
6. Lack of quality management 
7. Superiors abuse control 
8. Complexity of design 
9. Inability to attract and retain talent 
10. Bureaucratic procurement and acquisition process 
11. Poor project management 
12. Project Managers lack autonomy 
13. High turnover rate of project team 
14. Incompetence 
15. Poor planning 
16. Poor stakeholder analysis 
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Participant 4 
1. Lack of experience 
2. No quality audits 
3. Leadership 
4. Not understanding the risk 
5. Poor communication 
6. Lack of technical expertise 
7. High turnover rate of project team 
8. Unrealistic timeframe 
9. Poor quality management 
10. Complexity of design 
11. Poor project management techniques 
12. Poor stakeholder engagement  
13. Budget  
14. Incompetent Project Managers 
15. Lack of top management support 
16. Bad planning 
17. Budgetary constraints 
18. High turnover rate of project officers 
19. Poor risk management 
20. Procurement process 
21. Political interference 
22. Loss of talent 
23. Painful procurement process 
24. Poor project management 
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Participant 5 
1. Not performing quality audits 
2. Poor leadership 
3. Not understanding the risk 
4. Poor communication 
5. Poor quality management 
6. Lack of top management support 
7. Poor planning 
8. Unrealistic timeframe 
9. Seniours’ control 
10. Lack of experience 
11. Technical expertise lacking 
12. Budgetary constraints 
13. Lengthy Procurement process 
14. Political interference 
15. High turnover rate of project officers 
16. Poor risk planning 
17. Poor procurement  
18. High turnover rate of project team 
19. Incompetent Project Managers 
20. Poor project management 
21. Lack of independence of project managers 
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Participant 6 
1. No Support from the top 
2. Lack of plan 
3. Absence of leadership 
4. Poor communication 
5. Turnover rate 
6. Political influence 
7. Inexperienced project managers 
8. Poor project management 
9. Procurement process 
10. Budget constraints 
11. Independence of project managers 
12. Technical expertise 
13. Talent management  
14. Risk management 
15. Unrealistic timeframe 
16. Lack of funding 
17. Too much control from superiors 
18. High turnover rate of project officers 
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Participant 7 
1. Leadership 
2. No risk plan 
3. Politics 
4. Turnover rate is high 
5. Command and control 
6. Procurement process 
7. Absence of communication 
8. Lack of planning 
9. No top management support 
10. Inability to do audits 
11. Lack of technical expertise 
12. Project managers are too junior 
13. No independence of project managers 
14. Timeframe not real 
15. High turnover rate of project officers 
16. Unavailability of funds 
17. Poor project management techniques 
18. Painful procurement systems 
19. Too much control from the top 
20. Project officers not staying long in their posts 
 
